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Abstract Research on the phenomenology of agency for joint action has so far focused
on the sense of agency and control in joint action, leaving aside questions on
how it feels to act together. This paper tries to fill this gap in a way consistent
with the existing theories of joint action and shared emotion. We first recon-
struct Pacherie’s (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13, 25–46, 2014)
account on the phenomenology of agency for joint action, pointing out its two
problems, namely (1) the necessary trade-off between the sense of self- and we-
agency; and (2) the lack of affective phenomenology of joint action in general.
After elaborating on these criticisms based on our theory of shared emotion, we
substantiate the second criticism by discussing different mechanisms of shared
affect—feelings and emotions—that are present in typical joint actions. We
show that our account improves on Pacherie’s, first by introducing our agentive
model of we-agency to overcome her unnecessary dichotomy between a sense
of self- and we-agency, and then by suggesting that the mechanisms of shared
affect enhance not only the predictability of other agents’ actions as Pacherie
highlights, but also an agentive sense of we-agency that emerges from shared
emotions experienced in the course and consequence of joint action.
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1 Introduction
Phenomenology of joint action is a new interdisciplinary field in the research of
joint action. It has two roots: philosophical studies on the role of shared
intentions in rationally guiding and coordinating joint action; and empirical
research on the cognitive, perceptual, motor, and behavioral processes that
enable individuals to coordinate their actions, often without conscious
awareness. Drawing on research on the phenomenology of individual action
and experiences of individual agency, philosophers Elisabeth Pacherie (2012,
2014) and Deborah Tollefsen (2014) have proposed models that purport to
explain the phenomenology of joint action by integrating these philosophical
and empirical approaches. Surprisingly, however, both Pacherie and Tollefsen
largely neglect the affective phenomenology of joint action, although one would
expect otherwise from the title of one of Pacherie’s recent articles, BHow does
it feel to act together?^ The goal of this article, whose title slightly modifies
that of Pacherie’s, is to fill this affective gap in the phenomenology of joint
action.
We believe that this neglect is due to the close modeling of the phenomenology of
joint action on that of individual action, in which interpersonal affective processes do
not play a specific role. Researchers instead focus on mechanisms of action specifica-
tion and control that make joint action more complex than individual action, and on the
implications of these demands for the sense of agency and control in joint action. In
contrast to this cognitive approach, ours highlights the central roles affective rewards
(Godman 2013) play in creating the sense of we-agency, and the underlying motiva-
tional structures of joint action (Godman et al. 2014). This allows us to develop an
account of the sense of agency for joint action,1 in which Pacherie’s (2014) two senses
of agency for joint action, namely, Ba sense of agency for joint outcomes^ and B a sense
of we-agency^ are integrated.
The paper proceeds as follows: we first reconstruct Pacherie’s (2014) account
on the phenomenology of agency for joint action (Section 2). Another notable
contribution is Tollefsen (2014), but we focus on Pacherie as it is more
elaborate. 2 Then we formulate two problems concerning Pacherie’s account,
namely (1) that her view on the sense of we-agency as a fusion of individual
and agency for joint action implies a tradeoff between the sense of self- and
we-agency, which on our account is not necessary; and (2) that her account is
silent on the affective phenomenology of joint action in general, which is a
necessary and central building block of the account of a sense of we-agency we
develop (Section 3). Regarding the first criticism, we elucidate the ambiguous
1 Throughout the paper we use the term Bagency for joint action^ to refer to the general idea of agency which
is distinct from individual agency. One may well use Bcollective agency ,^ Bjoint agency^ or Bshared agency^
instead, but the important point is that the term is not dependent on any specific theory of non-individual
agency.
2 Tollefsen’s (2014) brief account of the sense of joint control in joint action is similar to Pacherie’s sense of
agency for joint outcomes in that it builds on a perceived match between the predicted and actual effects of
agency for joint action. The difference is that Tollefsen relates the sense of joint control functionally to
controlling and monitoring joint action, whereas for Pacherie, the phenomenology of we-agency is interesting
in its own right.
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notion of Bshared emotion,^ drawing on our theory of shared emotion that do
not presuppose such dichotomy (Section 4). We substantiate the second criti-
cism by discussing different mechanisms of shared affect—feelings and emo-
tions 3—that are present in typical joint actions (Section 5). Finally, in
Section 6, we show how our account improves on Pacherie’s (2014).
Specifically, we propose that these mechanisms of shared affect operate in the
same conditions that Pacherie proposes for a sense of agency for joint out-
comes. We suggest that these mechanisms enhance not only the predictability of
other agents’ actions as Pacherie highlights, but also an agentive sense of we-
agency that emerges centrally from shared emotions experienced in the course
and consequence of joint action. Our account of the affective phenomenology
of we-agency aims to overcome Pacherie’s dichotomy between a sense of self-
and we-agency, and to complement her account by identifying an important set
of affective mechanisms that enhance the sense of agency for joint outcomes.
Section 7 briefly concludes the discussion.
2 Pacherie on the phenomenology of joint action
Is the sense of agency for joint action distinct from that of individual agency? In her
recent article BHow does it feel to act together?^ (2014), Pacherie explores two ways in
which the former differs from the latter. The first way concerns the extent to which a
sense and strength of agency for joint action differs from a sense of agency for
individual action. Pacherie calls this Ba sense of agency for a joint outcome.^ (p. 26),
which is an outcome-related aspect. The second question is about the emergence of a
specific sense of agency for joint action, which Pacherie calls Ba sense of we-agency^
in joint action, which is an agent-related aspect.4 How are these two senses of agency
for joint action related? In this section, we reconstruct Pacherie’s (2014) account, before
highlighting its two problems in Section 3.
3 Feelings and emotions are types of Baffect^ that we, following a wide interdisciplinary consensus in
philosophy, psychology, and sociology, use as an umbrella term for phenomenal states with certain valence
and intensity. Emotions are felt evaluative responses to specific objects and events and they motivate the
subject to act in accordance with evaluative content of the emotion; to fight or flee in danger, to retaliate or
retribute when offended, to hide in shame, and so on. Feelings can be part of emotion, and they can be
experienced as bodily sensations or intentional feelings directed at the particular object of emotion or as both
kinds of feelings at the same time. However, not all feelings such as rapport or alienation are part of emotions.
Thus when we speak about Bshared affects^, we refer to shared emotions or shared feelings or both. The
notion of affect has a different meaning in the so called Baffect theory^ that is prevalent in cultural, media, and
gender studies (see e.g. Gregg and Seigworth 2010).
4 A possible philosophical worry about Pacherie’s – as well as our – project is that it is indeterminate until it is
clarified whether the concept of Bwe^ in Bwe-agency^ refers to a distributed or a non-distributed Bwe^ (see e.g.
Bratman 2014). An example of the former could be a group of students from different schools celebrating their
graduation on the same day, whereas a group of team members celebrating the victory of their team could
exemplify the latter kind of Bwe^. Pacherie does not raise this question in her discussion for good reasons, we
think. First of all, a theoretically pre-defined Bwe^ may not be salient in the phenomenology of we-agency that
purposefully avoids theory-laden accounts of experience. Second, a sharp dichotomy between a distributed
and non-distributed Bwe^ may be false in paradigm experiences of we-agency as these may combine a robust
sense of self-agency with that of we-agency, as we will argue in what follows.
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2.1 The sense of agency for a joint outcome
Pacherie suggests that Ba sense of agency for a joint outcome^ emerges from a match
between the predicted and actual consequences of the combined individual actions in
joint action. For instance, if you and I intend to prepare hollandaise sauce together by
you stirring the sauce and me pouring cream into it, our joint intention specifies the
predicted course and consequences of our action, with which the actual consequences
match to a greater or lesser extent. Making predictions about joint outcomes is more
difficult than making predictions about individual action’s outcomes for the obvious
reason that other agents’ actions remain beyond one’s control. Predicting joint out-
comes is hard also because the task is more complicated:
Agents must not just predict the consequences of their own actions at all three
[cognitive, perceptual, and sensorimotor] levels of action specification (self-
predictions), they must also do the same for the actions of their co-agents
(other-predictions), and finally integrate both self- and other-predictions to build
predictions about the joint consequences of their combined actions (joint predic-
tions). (Pacherie 2014, 33–34)
As a result,
The strength of the sense of agency for the joint outcome will depend on how
accurately one is able to make joint predictions, which in turn depends on the
extent and accuracy of self- and other predictions and on the manner of their
integration. (ibid.)
Pacherie suggests that such factors as the structure of the joint action, its scale, the
degree of specialization of agents’ roles, and the longevity of the collective affect the
sense of agency for joint action by affecting the availability of relevant information for
making accurate joint predictions.
Specifically, Pacherie (2014, 35) argues that Bparticipation in small-scale, egalitarian
actions, with little specialization of roles and a stable group of co-agents, is likely to
yield a stronger sense of agency than first-time participation in a large-scale, hierarchi-
cal joint action with highly differentiated roles^. This is because these four factors all
enhance other- and joint prediction: first, small-scale joint action in a shared physical
environment allows the participants to monitor and anticipate each other’s actions and
the consequences of those actions. Second, in egalitarian action, all participating agents
contribute more or less equally to the planning and execution of a joint action for which
they are jointly responsible. As the agents participate equally to the decision of the joint
goal and planning for it, they get knowledge of the other participants’ tasks and their
contribution to the joint goal. Third, near-identical or interchangeable roles in a joint
action allows the participants to have a motor repertoire Bto engage in perception-action
matching and motor simulation as well as the knowledge needed to form task repre-
sentations; they would thus be in a position to precisely represent the goals and actions
of their co-agents^ (Pacherie 2014, 35). Finally, the stability of the association among
co-agents forms a long-term collective whose members are used to working together with
many opportunities to form shared task representations. In sum, all these four features of a
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group—small-scale, egalitarian actions, unspecialized roles and stability—contribute to
the sense of agency for joint outcomes by facilitating predictions of the actions of their
co-agents and the consequences of those actions.
2.2 The sense of we-agency
Pacherie distinguishes Ba sense of we-agency^ from the Bsense of agency for a joint
outcome.^ As we saw in 2.1, the latter concerns outcomes over which the individual
can feel agency—if the outcome results from joint action the agency can be felt over the
joint outcome. However, this analysis does not fully address the question BIs the sense
of agency for joint action distinct from that of individual agency?^ Pacherie accord-
ingly introduces the former Bsense of we-agency,^ which she identifies with Ba merging
of one’s agency in the collective agency of the group^ (Pacherie 2014, 37). Pacherie’s
basic strategy to elucidate the distinctiveness of this sense of we-agency is to focus on
the self-other discrimination:
What form agentive identity takes depends on the extent to which the conditions
needed for self-other discrimination obtain. These conditions themselves can be
roughly distinguished into, on the one hand, structural conditions, i.e., factors
relating to the structural properties of the joint action, such as its more or less
pronounced hierarchical organization and division of labor among agents, and, on
the other hand, motivational conditions, the latter encompassing both the reasons
that motivated the agent to engage in a given joint action in the first place and the
motivational effects of the action itself (Pacherie 2014, 37).
Pacherie suggests that Bthe more commensurate the respective contributions of the
co-agents and the more symmetrical the coordination relations among them are (or are
perceived to be), the more likely it is that the sense of agency they will experience will
involve a shift towards a sense of we-agency^ (ibid., 38). The similarity and synchrony
of the co-agent’s actions contributes to a sense of we-agency by blurring the boundary
between self- and other-agency. Insofar as co-agents contribute equally to their shared
goal, as in team sports, the specialization of roles need not prevent their experience of
we-agency. Pacherie further claims that an even stronger sense of we-agency emerges
in joint actions with nearly identical or interchangeable roles such as military drill or
communal dancing that allow for a merging of the individual agency to a agency for
joint action. These examples also highlight the contribution of shared social identity to
the experience of we-agency. Shared social identity can be strengthened by dress codes,
hair styles and other visible marks of similarity, as in the military or in team sports.
Relating to the second, motivational conditions of a sense of we-agency, Pacherie
observes an important point that Bthe very motivations that lead an agent to engage in
joint action may influence the way agency will be experienced^ (p. 40). But she does
not develop this further, simply noting that shared social identity is associated with
motor synchrony, action co-representation, and cooperativeness. She refers to empirical
studies suggesting that group membership modulates nonconscious behavioral mimic-
ry, which, together with motor synchrony, promotes positive relationships, affiliation,
prosocial behavior, and cooperation (Chartrand and Bargh 1999; Lakin et al. 2003; van
Baaren et al. 2004; Wiltermuth and Heath 2009). Here Pacherie briefly touches on the
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contribution of affects to a phenomenology of we-agency, but the remark remains
underdeveloped (we revisit these studies in Section 5).
3 Two problems of Pacherie’s account
Pacherie’s account of the sense of agency for joint action is the most sophis-
ticated one currently available, informed by both the philosophical and empir-
ical literature. However, it suffers from two related problems, which we discuss
in turn below.
3.1 The sense of we-agency as Bone-ness^
The first problem is that it is not clear how the outcome-based sense of agency
for joint action and the sense of we-agency are related. On the one hand, the
sense of agency for joint outcomes requires the self-other discrimination be-
cause her crucial condition for this sense depends on successful self-, other-,
and joint-predictions (see also Pacherie 2014, 37). On the other, according to
her account the experience of we-agency centrally depends on weakening of the
self-other agential distinction. So the two senses of agency for joint action seem
to be in tension, one requiring a clear self-other agential distinction while the
other demanding its weakening.
A closer look at the structural conditions she identifies for both senses of agency for
joint action, however, suggests that there are cases where both senses can be simulta-
neously strengthened. In particular, joint action with egalitarian and commensurate
roles of co-actors facilitates both senses of agency for joint action, by making joint
predictions easier (resulting in a stronger sense of agency for joint outcomes) while
loosening the self-other boundary (resulting in a stronger sense of we-agency) at the
same time. But it is difficult to make sense of a cognitive activity like prediction for
joint outcomes when the self-other boundary is blurred. Is it a Bwe-agent^ who is
making predictions here?5
We therefore propose an alternative conceptualization of the sense of we-agency,
which derives from agentively contributing to a shared goal together with others in a
cooperative manner. This experience is enacted by sharing a goal and contributing to it
jointly with others, and enhanced by successfully achieving it. So it is compatible with
Pacherie’s Bsense of agency for joint outcomes,^ but it replaces her Bsense of we-
agency^ because it doesn’t depend on losing or loosening one’s agential self in acting
as a collective agent.
To see the difference between our agentive notion of a sense of we-agency
and that of Pacherie’s, recall two examples in which a sense of we-agency can
arise, a sport team and a military unit. Pacherie calls the case of the sport team
5 In interpreting the results of the limited empirical studies on the relation between self-agency and we-agency,
Pacherie (2014, 38–39) warns against identifying we-agency with pre-reflective cognitive processes that are
immune to conscious top-down influence. This cautious note implies that she is thinking of the sense of we-
agency as something individuals can (at least sometimes) reflectively experience and exert top-down influence
on. If this is the case, then the loss of self-other agential boundary seems too strong a condition for her own
account of the sense of we-agency.
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Bmixed^ or Bintermediate^ as opposed to the Bpure^ case of the military unit
because a sense of self-agency in the former remains active whereas it is lost in
the latter. Construing the sense of we-agency the team players can have as
necessarily a compromised one in this manner, however, creates an unnecessary
dichotomy between self-agency and we-agency. On our account, what is nec-
essary is that the individuals are motivated to play their part in achieving a
shared goal, and that they have control over their own action that contributes to
it. Understood this way, there need not be a trade-off between the sense of self-
agency and that of we-agency; that is, increasing one does not necessarily
decrease the other.
Of course, we do not deny the experiential distinctiveness and social relevance of the
kind of experience Pacherie characterizes as a sense of unity or Bone-ness^, a loss of
boundary between self- and other-agency. It is an empirical question which sense of
we-agency is prominent in a given group, and we might speculate that it depends on the
kind of joint actions. For example, experiences of boundary loss seem more prevalent
in ritualistic joint actions that have no proximate purpose beyond the activity (see
Section 5.2 below), whereas experiences of interdependent cooperation emerge in the
context of purposive joint action. Both kinds of joint actions clearly have important
roles in our social lives.
Nevertheless, we argue that our agentive account of the sense of we-agency
has several merits that the Bone-ness^ account lacks. First, as Pacherie herself
points out (2014, 38–39), the results of available empirical studies do not
support the trade-off between the senses of self- and we-agency. Our account
is consistent with this interpretation. Second, our account coheres better with
Pacherie’s sense of agency for joint outcomes than her own Bone-ness^ account
of we-agency. We show how shared affects can contribute to both Pacherie’s
sense of agency for joint outcomes and our agentive sense of we-agency
without creating any tension between the two (Section 6). Third, our account
better accommodates the various forms of affective experience in joint action,
which we review in Section 5 below. Finally, our account is more consistent
with philosophical analyses of joint action. An awareness of us doing some-
thing together conceptually presupposes the awareness of self-agency, two or
more individuals experiencing themselves as Bus^. None of the prominent
philosophical theories of we-agency or shared agency requires that individuals
are feeling as indiscriminate part of a plural subject that acts when a group
acts.6 The phenomenologist Dan Zahavi similarly argues that sharing attention
or emotions with others has Bnothing to do with fusion, nor with a merged
unity. Sharing involves a plurality of subjects, but it also involves more than
mere summation or aggregation.^ (Zahavi 2015, 90). We suggest that the same
goes with the sense of we-agency: it has more to do with a strong sense of
self-other interdependence in action than with losing or loosening the distinc-
tion between self and other.
6 Although some theorists attribute intentions to groups in addition to their members, they all admit that
groups act only through their members. Gilbert (2014) for example argues that the participants of joint action
are jointly committed to constituting, as far as possible, a single subject of action. Yet this only amounts to the
parties’ being jointly committed to emulating, by virtue of their actions, a single subject of action.
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3.2 How does it really feel like to act together? The affective phenomenology
of joint action
The second problem of Pacherie’s (2014) account of the sense of agency in
joint action concerns her relative silence on the affective phenomenology of
joint action in general, and her understanding of its contribution to a sense of
we-agency in particular.7 As we noted in Section 2.2, Pacherie rightly observes
that Bthe very motivations that lead an agent to engage in joint action may
influence the way agency will be experienced.^ (p. 40) She also mentions,
drawing on empirical studies, several psychological processes through which
shared social identity and joint action are mutually reinforced. But she links the
affective experience resulting from these processes directly to the sense of we-
agency based on the loss of self-other distinction, which we criticize above.
Now that we proposed an alternative sense of we-agency, we do two things in
the remainder of the paper. First, we discuss in further detail the affective
phenomenology of joint action, that is, several mechanisms that generate shared
affects –feelings and emotions– when individuals pursue and achieve their
shared goals together in joint action. We argue that these shared affects render
joint action rewarding in their own right and thus motivating for the partici-
pants. Second, we show that these affective rewards do not necessarily blur the
boundary between self-agency and we-agency. In other words, we try to fill the
affective gap in the phenomenology of joint action, in such a way that is
consistent with our agentive account of the sense of we-agency.
In order to achieve these goals, we first need to do some preliminary work. We first
elucidate the ambiguous notion of Bshared emotions^ based on our philosophical
account of these emotions in Section 4 below. Then we analyze different mechanisms
of shared affect that are present in typical joint actions in Section 5. We finally suggest
that these mechanisms operate in the same conditions that Pacherie proposes for a sense
of agency for joint outcomes, enhancing both the predictability of other agents’ actions
that Pacherie highlights in her account, and an agentive sense of we-agency that we
propose emerges from shared emotions in joint action (Section 6). In this way, our
account of the affective phenomenology of we-agency utilizes Pacherie’s account of the
sense of agency for joint outcomes and replaces Pacherie’s unnecessary dichotomy
between a sense self-agency and we-agency.
4 What are shared emotions?
The notion of Bshared emotion^ is ambiguous. On the one hand, sharing of emotion
refers to a phenomenon in which one person’s expressed emotion is perceived by
another person. This is the sense that John Michael (2011) and some theorists of
empathy (e.g. Rimé 2007) have in mind when they discuss shared emotions. Thus,
7 Her recent paper with John Michael (Michael and Pacherie 2015, p. 107) touches upon this issue in
discussing moral sentiments and emotions as an automatic process to reduce uncertainty and achieve
cooperation in social dilemma situations. The focus of that paper however is not phenomenological but
functional.
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Michael gives two necessary but not sufficient conditions for sharing an emotion
between two persons, x and y:
(a) x expresses his affective state (verbally or otherwise);
(b) y perceives this expression.
On the other hand, the notion of sharing refers to several individuals experiencing an
emotion of the same type and content, such as celebrating the success of their favorite
team with other fans, with mutual awareness of their respective emotional state (joy).
Most philosophical and empirical accounts of shared and collective emotions have been
interested in the latter kind of phenomena, invoking the notion of sharing in this sense.
Likewise, we suggest the following formulation: x and y share an emotion, or equiv-
alently have a collective emotion if,
(c) x and y experience an emotion of the same type with similar:
(i) evaluative content and
(ii) affective experience; and
(d) x and y are mutually aware that (c).
Phenomenologically, the evaluative content and affective experience of an emotion
are typically intertwined and intentionally directed at the particular object of emotion.
While the evaluative content of an emotion is necessarily intentional, the affective
experience is only contingently so (see 4.2 below). Both of these main dimensions of
emotion can also be elaborated in terms of their degree of collectivity (see Salmela
2012, 2013 for more detailed accounts).8
4.1 Evaluative content
There is a wide interdisciplinary agreement among emotion researchers that emotions
could not exist without underlying concerns, representations with the world-to-mind
direction of fit such as desires, goals, norms or values (Roberts 2003). Therefore, when
a group of people are said to experience a shared emotion, we must ask what kind of
concern they share, and to what extent. In other words, sharing the evaluative content of
emotion is a matter of appraising the particular object of emotion similarly with other
people on the basis of concerns that can be shared to a varying extent.9 We propose that
this degree of sharedness of concerns determines the degree of sharedness of emotions.
In the weakest form of collectivity, people have overlapping private concerns. Insofar
as people pursue their own survival, security, attachment, health, happiness, and
attachment, these are private concerns. Tuomela (2007) calls concerns of this kind plain
8 There are other philosophical theories of shared emotions, most notably those of Gilbert (2002), Schmid
(2009), and Huebner (2011). For a discussion and critique of the former two, see Salmela (2012).
9 The appraisal process need not be collective though it can be in some cases, such as when an emotional
appraisal is formed as a result of public discussion (see Halperin 2014). More typically, though, emotional
appraisals are so fast and modular that it is impossible to make let alone commit oneself to them collectively
(but see Gilbert 2002, 2014).
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I-mode concerns. The fact that private concerns are general or even universal
among all humans amounts to their being collective in terms of their type but
not in terms of their token identity as each person is concerned about getting
the relevant goods for him- or herself. In the latter sense, overlapping private
concerns are common rather than robustly collective. This implies that concerns
of this kind can be in conflict with each other. Concerns can be collective in a
stronger sense when individuals are privately committed to some shared token
concern [in part because of] believing that the others in the group have the
same concern, and also believing this is mutually believed in the group. Thus,
for instance, if John as a Liverpool fan is concerned about the future of this
prestigious football club, not only does he believe that the other Liverpool fans
have the same concern, but also that the other fans believe the same about his
and other fans’ having the concern in question. The bracketed clause refers to
the fact that many of our shared concerns are socially grounded. Tuomela has
characterized this type of collectivity as pro-group I-mode or, more recently
(Tuomela 2013), weak we-mode collectivity. In contrast to overlapping private
concerns, moderately (as well as strongly) collective concerns are non-compet-
itive. Finally, the strongest mode of collectivity in sharing concerns is founded
on the group members’ collective commitment, either explicit or implicit.
Through their collective commitment, the group members adopt the concern
as theirs in a strong we-mode sense. Collective commitment provides the group
members group reasons to think, want, feel, and act in ways that are in
accordance with their shared concern. Moreover, the group members are
allowed to revise their commitment to the shared concern only by reasons that
are acceptable from the group’s point of view.
4.2 Affective experience
Shared concerns provide both motivating and justifying reasons for the emergence of
shared emotions when individuals perceive that their shared concerns are affected either
adversely or favorably.10 In addition, shared concerns sometimes give rise to the kind of
non-reflective absorption in shared emotional experience in which the evaluative and
affective dimensions of emotion become thoroughly intertwined, sometimes taking the
form of a phenomenological fusion of feelings into Bour^ feeling that Schmid (2009)
highlights as the core of shared emotions. However, we regard a feeling of phenom-
enological fusion as neither sufficient nor necessary for sharing emotions: it is not
sufficient because it is possible to experience such fusion in the context of otherwise
10 The idea of emotions having reasons may strike one as strange. However, the idea that emotions have both
justifying and motivating reasons is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy of emotions and metaethics
(e.g. Greenspan 1988 D’Arms and Jacobson 2000 Helm 2008; Brady 2011). Emotions have justifying
reasons as they are liable to evaluation in terms of appropriateness like other intentional attitudes. For instance,
my fear is appropriate if the object of my fear has properties that render it capable of inflicting significant harm
on me. Justifying reasons of shared emotions may refer to collectively accepted attitudes of a group, such as its
values, goals, or intentions. The same group attitudes may also serve as motivating reasons of shared
emotions. Since emotions are not under voluntary control, there can be no deliberation on reasons to feel in
the same way as there is deliberation on reasons to act. However, we can talk about reasons (rather than mere
causes) of emotion because human emotions are not reflexes or fixed action patterns but flexible responses to
cognitively processed situational meanings.
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dissimilar emotions with importantly dissimilar underlying concerns.11 The emotion
felt as Bours^ must also have underlying shared concerns to qualify as strongly
collective. Nor is the experience of fusion necessary because a shared emotional
experience may take other forms, depending on whether the participants are focusing
on the intentional object of emotion or their own bodily states rather than on their Bone-
ness^ or togetherness in experiencing the emotion (see Lambie and Marcel 2002).
Instead of highlighting any particular form of shared affective experience as
privileged, we want to emphasize a set of mechanisms that is causally responsible for
producing shared affectivity that is experienced in different ways. These mechanisms
synchronize various aspects of individual emotional responses—physiological changes,
facial expressions, action tendencies, and subjective feelings. Causal mechanisms that
contribute to the synchronization of emotional responses include attentional deploy-
ment (Collins 2004), emotional contagion (Hatfield et al. 1994), facial mimicry
(Bourgois and Hess 2008), motor mimicry and imitation (Chartrand and Bargh
1999), and neural mirroring (Decety and Meyer 2008). These mechanisms operate
most efficiently when the participants with a shared emotion are physically co-present
and jointly attend to the shared object of their emotion as Durkheim (2001) and Collins
(2004) propose in their ritualistic sociological theories of emotion.12 When emotions
are shared in virtual contexts without a live video or audio stream between the
participants, emotions are expressed and communicated by linguistic and sym-
bolic means that cannot fully replace perceptually mediated processes of affec-
tive synchrony.13 Still there are shared affective experiences online insofar as
the participants are mutually aware that they are feeling the same.
4.3 Types of shared emotions
Finally, beginning from the weakest type of shared emotion, we suggest that these
emotions typically emerge when a group of individuals appraise the emotion-eliciting
event convergently in relation to their overlapping private concerns, and such mecha-
nisms as attentional deployment, emotional contagion, facial and motor mimicry, and
behavioral entrainment synchronize the individuals’ emotional responses, producing a
11 Schmid’s two examples of shared feelings with a phenomenological fusion serve as evidence for this worry.
His first example are parents who grieve over the death of their beloved child. The parents share a concern for
the child and its well-being in a jointly committed sense that emerges from their love for the child as parents
and their reciprocal affective ties as a couple. The second example is joy at the first performance of a
symphony, shared by all participants of the event, including the audience, members of the orchestra, the
composer, and the stage manager. All participants share a concern about the success of the performance but in
significantly different roles. The musicians have jointly committed themselves to offering an excellent
performance, whereas the audience has not committed itself to anything; its role amounts to attentive listening
at most. Therefore, if a successful performance elicits shared joy with a phenomenological fusion of feelings
among everyone present, as Schmid suggests, the emotions of the participants are significantly dissimilar to
each other in terms of the underlying concerns, unlike in the case of the grieving parents.
12 For a more thorough theoretical account on the elicitation of shared emotions, see von Scheve and Ismer
(2013).
13 Existing studies on affective synchrony focus on face-to-face interaction, and there is a lacuna in the
understanding of the kind of processes that contribute to the synchronization of individual emotions in
computer-mediated, linguistic and symbolic communication insofar as synchronization occurs in these
contexts. Therefore, we treat the better understood emotional sharing in face-to-face interaction as a paradigm
case in our analysis.
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shared affective experience among individuals who are mutually aware that others are
feeling the same.14 An example of this kind of shared emotion is shareholders’ fear of a
market meltdown. Moderately shared emotions have moderately collective concerns as
the underlying ground of emotional appraisals. A shared affective experience emerges
through similar mechanisms, and shared group membership reinforces the synchroni-
zation process, adding to the intensity of the shared affective experience. Moderately
shared emotions are functionally and phenomenologically experienced in the role of a
group member, but the group membership is normatively weak because it is maintained
through a private identification or commitment. Here an example could be joy about the
victory of one’s favorite football team that one shares with other fans of the team.
Finally, strongly shared emotions are felt as a group member in a normatively strong
sense that is founded on a collective commitment to the underlying shared concern. The
strong collectivity of an emotion is also reflected in the degree of synchronization of
individual emotional responses and in the evaluative content of the group members’
emotions. Thus the members of a winning team do not rejoice merely in winning the
championship but instead in Bour winning the championship^ or in Bour
accomplishment^. In this way, collective content in the sense of indexicality and mode
are built into shared emotions of the strongest kind.
We will return to the typology of shared emotions in Section 6 where we will argue
that stronger types of shared emotions contribute significantly to both Pacherie’s
outcome-based sense of agency for joint action and to our agential sense of we-agency.
Before that, we discuss in detail different mechanisms that contribute to the emergence
of shared affects in joint action. This discussion will show that shared affects motivate
people to participate in joint action by creating a positive, rewarding experience of we-
agency.
5 Mechanisms of shared affect in joint action
In the previous section we suggested that shared emotions involve interpersonal
synchrony in both cognitive and bodily processes. Accordingly, they can en-
hance both the predictability of others’ actions and an agentive sense of we-
agency. In this section, we discuss several ways in which shared emotions and
feelings can emerge in joint action, rendering it rewarding to the co-agents, and
thereby also contributing to their sense of we-agency. Shared emotions have
similar effects across different degrees of collectivity, but there are several
mechanisms through which these effects become more robust when shared
emotions are stronger in terms of evaluative intentionality and affective expe-
rience. First we review evidence on the affective rewards of mere behavioral
synchrony (5.1), which Pacherie and Tollefsen also mention, and then comple-
ment it with the literature on collective effervescence (5.2), which they don’t discuss.
This affective mechanism can illustrate a way in which ritualistic interactions
14 Shared emotions of this kind may not be collectively intentional as they lack a shared intentional object and
an underlying shared concern. However, we would not go so far as to deny that these emotions are collective
or shared in any sense. Empirical studies of shared or collective or group emotions generally do not distinguish
between these importantly dissimilar types of shared emotions even if their social consequences can differ
significantly, as we argue in Salmela and Nagatsu 2016.
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facilitate social cohesion by providing affective rewards, but it leaves unex-
plained why stronger forms of shared emotions rather than mere synchrony are
more powerful in this regard. So we employ Adam Smith’s classic theory of
fellow-feelings to explain this (5.3). Lastly we extend our cases to social
exchanges in general, and argue that the same affective mechanisms are at play
in instrumental interactions (5.4).
5.1 Affective rewards of behavioral synchrony
An association between synchronised behavior and positive interpersonal affect has
been established in several studies. These affective rewards including feelings of
solidarity, rapport, affiliation, interpersonal liking, as well as prosocial and cooperative
motivation, are associated with different types of synchrony, such as synchronized
motor representations (Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004), body postures and gaze patterns
(Shockley et al. 2009), speech patterns (Fowler et al. 2008), facial expressions
(Chartrand and Bargh 1999), or heart rate (Vikhoff et al. 2013) of the interacting
agents. Importantly, synchrony yields affective rewards even when it is accidental
rather than purposefully achieved by the participants, e.g., when individuals walk, tap
fingers, rock chairs, and so on, or perceive figures or sounds (e.g. Hove and Risen
2009; Miles et al. 2009). In these cases, there is little opportunity for feedback and little
history of social interaction, or reason to suppose the presence of shared intentionality
in acting. Nevertheless, individuals who engaged in synchronous behavior reported
greater feelings of interpersonal connectedness, rapport, and affiliation, and they
sometimes cooperated more in social dilemma situations than people in asynchronous
conditions (Wiltermuth and Heath 2009). This suggests that behavioral synchrony
constitutes a basic building block for our daily interactions with others, and the
inherently rewarding aspect of such behaviors explains why we are prima facie
motivated to participate in joint actions that involve aspects of synchrony (Godman
2013; Godman et al. 2014).
The fact that synchronous behaviors are regular part of joint action, as
Pacherie (2014) and Tollefsen (2014) have observed, implies that this mecha-
nism of shared affect also operates in most instances of joint action. Of course,
the affective rewards of synchrony may not suffice to render the overall
affective quality of a joint action hedonically positive, as when we carry a
heavy sofa together, for example. But if individuals experience even contingent
behavioral synchrony as rewarding in its own right, we should expect them to
purposefully engage in forms of social interaction in which synchrony and the
adjacent rewards are produced. This seems to happen in ritualistic behaviors
such as plays, games, singing, dancing, worship, and other ceremonies. We now
turn to the affective experience in these rituals.
5.2 Collective effervescence
The Durkheimian tradition of sociology has analyzed the emergence of shared
emotions in ritualistic social interaction. These theorists suggest that the func-
tion of all social interaction, whether or not we are aware of it, is to produce
affective rewards for the participants and to reinforce social cohesion in the
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group (e.g. Durkheim [1912] 2001; Collins 2004, 2014; Knottnerus 2010;
Summers-Effler 2007). This ultimately serves to increase the adaptiveness of
the community (Collins 2004). At the proximate level, we seek affective boost
from interactions that we have experienced as rewarding and avoid emotionally
draining interactions. Indeed, for ritual theorists, the fundamental drive to
maximize our emotional energy is Bbehind individual behavior, group activity,
culture, and networks^ (Summers-Effler 2007, 139).
Durkheim is the locus classicus of the ritualistic tradition with his notion of
collective effervescence (effervescence collective) though he did not develop an elab-
orate theory of collective emotions. His analysis of the ritualistic emergence of
collective emotions in the gatherings of people with common beliefs and convictions
has offered the foundation for later sociological accounts, such as Randall Collins’
theory of the emergence and reproduction of collective emotions in the context of
interaction rituals that we discuss below.
Ritual ingredients include a group of people who are physically assembled in the
same place and separated from those who are excluded from the ritual. The group
members focus their attention on some common object or activity, and by communi-
cating this focus to each other become mutually aware of their shared focus of attention.
Finally, the group members share a common mood or emotion. These initiating affects
spread and intensify in the group’s interaction rituals, such as chants, songs, dances, or
games, through emotional contagion and rhythmic synchronization of bodily responses
as well as through the group members’ reflexive awareness of their shared experience.
Collins characterizes the result as collective effervescence, i.e., heightened intersubjec-
tivity in which B[t]he key process is participants’ mutual entrainment of emotion and
attention, producing a shared emotion/cognitive experience^ (Collins 2004, 48). A
successful interaction ritual produces emotional energy—confidence, enthusiasm, and
good self-feelings—for the participants; collective symbols—emblems, signs, slogans,
buzzwords, ideas, or other representations—also infused with emotional energy; feel-
ings of solidarity; and standards of morality: respect for the group and its symbols and
anger at violations against them.
From our perspective, the main contribution of ritualistic theories is their detailed
description of how the emotional quality of ritualistic activities builds up from the
elements of engagement in joint activity, such as the separation of the participants from
the rest, their shared focus of attention, and an initial common mood or emotion. The
emergence of collective effervescence is a dynamic process which proceeds from the
mutually reinforcing interplay of these ritual ingredients.
Although Pacherie does not refer to the literature on collective effervescence, it
enriches and benefits her discussion on the sense of we-agency in joint action. First, at
the height of collective effervescence, the participants of a ritual may also experience
the kind of oneness, or a loss of boundary between self- and other-agency, that Pacherie
highlights as a sense of pure we-agency. Second, affective rewards from behavioral
synchrony and alignment that Pacherie mentions may constitute one source of the
initial shared affective state that spreads and intensifies in the course of an interaction
ritual. We suggest that another source of shared affects in rituals are internal goals and
standards of excellence of rituals, such as staying in the same rhythm when we are
dancing or singing together, doing some difficult part of our joint performance, and
completing the performance rather than interrupting it. Shared emotions may emerge as
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rational responses to jointly achieving or failing to meet those internal norms of rituals.
Such emotions include excitement before and during the performance of a ritual; joy
when it succeeds; fear when its successful performance is threatened; disappointment at
its failure; anger at those disturbing the ritual or violating its rules, and so on (Parkinson
et al. 2005; Helm 2008; Salmela 2012).
This motivation for joint activities internal to rituals and the rewards from
them are the key to unpacking what the ritual theories mean by Bemotional
energy^ that motivates people to return to those activities, either with the same
interactors, or with other masters of the same activities as is the case with
singing and dancing, for instance. But we still haven’t explained why successful
rituals create feelings of solidarity and interpersonal liking. What is it in
sharing emotions with others that has these effects? We argue that Adam
Smith’s classic theory of fellow-feelings addresses this question.
5.3 Fellow-feelings and the pleasure in corresponding sentiments
Smith, in his classic The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), argues that our
prosociality and tendency to do things together with others rather than alone can be
explained by a reward produced in a two-stage psychological mechanism.
Fellow-feeling is a form of empathy that allows us to feel, in a weaker degree, what
another person feels through an imaginative placing of ourselves into his or her
situation. As lively consciousness of another person’s affective state, fellow-feeling
produces correspondence of sentiments between the empathizing and the empathized
subject. When the subjects become aware of the correspondence of sentiments, this
realization gives them an additional source of pleasure. Smith claims that this aware-
ness is rewarding regardless of whether the given sentiment is pleasurable or painful,
and that the pleasure from correspondence overweighs the painful sentiment such that
people seek such correspondence whenever possible. In Smith’s words, the awareness
of correspondence in sentiments Benlivens joy and alleviates grief.^ (Smith [1759]
2002, 18).
Robert Sugden (2002) claims that Smith is best interpreted as arguing for a general
hypothesis that any correspondence of sentiments, whether caused by a fellow-feeling
or some other mechanism, is a source of pleasure, and the lack thereof a source of pain.
From our perspective, another important way in which people come to have corre-
sponding sentiments is by sharing emotions grounded on a shared concern. In sum, the
Smith-Sugden hypothesis states that this reward from the correspondence of senti-
ments, whether it comes from fellow-feelings or shared emotions, is primarily respon-
sible for individuals’ tendency to try to align their sentiments with those of others.
Accordingly, the feelings of solidarity and interpersonal liking that ritualists highlight
are subjective manifestations of this specific reward system.
The Smith-Sugden hypothesis explains some phenomena that ritualistic theorists of
social interaction have identified, but without specifying their psychological mecha-
nisms. Collins argues that the initial common affects of individuals can be either
positive or negative but the resulting collective emotional experience nevertheless has
a positive quality or side to it. For instance, in funerals the ritual allows the bereaved
family members and friends of the deceased to express their grief to each other and
become consoled by the shared experience. The same mechanism operates in positive
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emotions where awareness of shared experience amplifies the positive quality of the
experience. Experience tells us that watching a game of our favorite team is more
exciting and fun when we do it together with fellow fans of the team, either at the
stadium or at home via TV, than watching the game alone. Pleasures of awareness of
Bfeeling the same^ emerge when individuals become aware of their shared sentiments,
and the anticipation of those inherently pleasant feelings reinforces future interactions
in which such sentiments are likely to be experienced.
The Smith-Sugden hypothesis can also account for the difference between rewards
from joint intentional actions and those from mere behavioral synchrony discussed in
5.1. The latter have been reported in studies in which synchrony was accidental rather
than purposefully achieved by the participants and there is little opportunity for the
participants to be aware of the corresponding sentiments in others. The pleasure from
shared feelings and emotions in contrast crucially depends on such awareness.
Evidence from these synchrony studies suggests that convergent positive feelings
brought about by behavioral synchrony may function as coordination smoothers. If
this is the case, shared emotions experienced in joint intentional activities such as
singing and dancing, or preparing dinner together are likely to be even more efficient
and reliable in achieving a joint goal, since those emotions of which the participants are
mutually aware provide them both pleasure in correspondence and important feedback
on their progress in the joint task. Indeed, many synchrony studies have been conduct-
ed in the context of joint intentional activities (e.g. Kirschner and Tomasello 2010;
Reddish et al. 2013). Here mere synchrony does not explain the emotional effects of
joint action because shared emotions based on shared goals of the action and its actual
performance also contribute to the participants’ reported positive emotions, strength-
ening the rewards from converging sentiments.
5.4 Shared affects in social exchange
Ritualistic joint actions have no proximate purpose beyond the activity. Therefore, it is
plausible that we engage in those activities for their intrinsic affective rewards. However,
we also do things together with others for instrumental reasons, in order to reach our
individual goals by means of joint action. In this subsection, we show that affective
rewards from sharing emotions are relevant in those instrumental joint actions as well.
Instrumental joint actions serve the self-interest of the participants by yielding rewards or
outcomes that the participants value individually rather than collectively. When this kind of
interaction is repeated, we can talk about social exchange. In general, a social exchange takes
two or more people to accomplish it; the participants have to coordinate with one another in
order to succeed in the task; and they experience costs if they fail in the task (Lawler et al.
2009, 56). Many economic and social interactions have these features, which game theorists
model as problems of coordination and cooperation, with and without conflict.
Edward Lawler, Shane Thye, and Jeongkoo Yoon have argued in a series of
empirical and theoretical contributions (e.g. 2008, 2009, 2014) that social exchanges
that begin with instrumental motivations are capable of giving rise to strong affective
person-to-person and person-to-social unit ties that transform the motivational structure
of those exchanges. The idea is that emotions and feelings emerge as by-products of
instrumental social exchange but once generated, they transform instrumental transac-
tional ties into expressive relational ties where affiliation with the relevant exchange
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partners and unit comes to have an intrinsic value. The theory breaks into two
complementary horns, relational cohesion theory and affect theory of social
exchange, both of which highlight the role of shared affects arising from social
exchange.
The relational cohesion theory focuses on the dependence or interdependence of
actors. The theory suggests that when there is equal power relation and high
interdependence between the actors, repeated exchanges in these conditions pro-
duce positive emotions, which in turn produce perceptions of relational cohesion,
which further increase exchange frequency and commitment behaviors such as
staying in the relationship in spite of having better alternatives, and cooperating
in a social dilemma situation (see also Michael and Pacherie 2015). A voluntary
choice of exchange partners amplifies this endogenous process in comparison to an
involuntary one. Importantly, this process of from-exchange-to-emotion-to-cohesion
has been reported in experiments where anonymous subjects negotiate agreements
across several episodes via computers without ever seeing each other or the other
actor’s payoffs (Lawler et al. 2008). Although these standard conditions of social
psychological research militate against the endogenous process, evidence supports
the predictions of the theory.
The affect theory of social exchange introduces the notion of social unit attribution
as a link between individual emotions and person-to-group affective ties. Thus
Lawler and others suggest that successful social exchange gives rise to positive
feelings and emotions, such as excitement, pleasure, gratitude, and pride, which are
attributed to or associated with the relevant relational units or social groups.
Attributions of emotions to social units involve attachment when individual emo-
tions from social exchange are positive, and detachment when those emotions are
negative. These attributions are strongest in joint tasks with high interdependence
and shared responsibility of the actors. The greater the non-separability of individ-
uals’ impact on the success or failure in a joint task, the greater the perception of
shared responsibility for success or failure in the task, and, consequently, the
inclination of agents to attribute the resulting emotions to the relevant social unit.
When social unit attributions are strong, successful exchanges result in positive
emotions for everyone involved: pride in self and gratitude toward others. Mutually
felt positive emotions also increase interpersonal trust and solidarity, understood as
Bthe strength and durability of person-to-group and person-to-person relations^
(Lawler 2001, 329).
In a recent theoretical contribution, Lawler et al. (2014) suggest that shared
emotions reinforce the processes of relational cohesion and social unit attribu-
tion. The emergence of shared emotions requires that the participants of a joint
task become aware of their sharing the same emotion. Our discussion in the
previous subsection (5.3) indicates that shared emotions strengthen the process-
es of relational cohesion and social unit attribution through the pleasures from
corresponding sentiments that emerge when the participants of a joint task
become aware of feeling the same. Since joint actions that figure in social
exchange are typically temporally extended with agents who form a longer-term
collective, these mechanisms of shared affect are likely to underpin the pro-
cesses that Lawler and his colleagues articulate in their theory of social
exchange.
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6 Shared emotions and the phenomenology of joint action
Finally, it is time to bring the preceding discussion on the mechanisms of
shared affect in joint action to bear on the phenomenology of joint action,
and on the sense of we-agency in particular. In Section 5 we showed how our
account of shared emotions and the sense of we-agency accommodates the
various forms of affective experience in joint action. In particular, we have
seen that shared emotions are noncontingent concomitants and consequences of
most joint actions, even in instrumentally motivated social exchanges. Shared
emotions are capable of rendering joint actions rewarding in their own right to
the participants. This is already an important contribution to the phenomenology
of joint action as it implies one answer to the question, How does it feel to act
together? Simply put, it feels good. However, shared emotions contribute to the
more specific phenomenology of we-agency in many respects as well. In this
penultimate section, we discuss these respects to show how our account coheres
better with Pacherie’s sense of agency for joint outcomes than her own Bone-
ness^ account of we-agency.
Remember Pacherie’s structural conditions that favor the sense of agency for
joint outcomes: Bparticipation in small-scale, egalitarian actions, with little
specialization of roles and a stable group of co-agents, is likely to yield a
stronger sense of agency than first-time participation in a large-scale, hierarchi-
cal joint action with highly differentiated roles^ (Pacherie 2014, 35). We
propose that these conditions also contribute to the emergence of shared
emotions and feelings that enhance both the predictability of other agents’
actions that Pacherie highlights in her outcome-based sense of agency for joint
action, and the agentive sense of we-agency that coexists with a strong sense of
self-agency. We put forward the latter as the core sense of we-agency.
The structural conditions of the sense of agency for joint outcomes support the
emergence of shared emotions in many ways. First, the small scale of joint action
typically brings along a shared physical environment in which the co-agents can
perceive each other’s actions during their joint action. Together with near-identical or
interchangeable roles, the small scale of joint action contributes to nonconscious
behavioral synchrony and motor simulation which give rise to positive feelings in the
sense of increased affiliation and positive relationships, as Pacherie remarks. We add
that these affective rewards are typically mediated and reinforced by the co-agents’
mutual awareness that the others are feeling the same. Indeed, the small scale of joint
action such as singing or dancing together allows for and supports such awareness.
Ritualistic joint actions of this kind are also paradigmatic examples of collective
effervescence in which shared emotions intensify and spread among the co-agents
through extensive behavioral synchrony and entrainment. Finally, the stability of the
co-agents and their shared social identity are important for emotional mimicry and
contagion as we mimic the facial, vocal, and postural expressions of emotion more with
those with whom we share group membership than with out-group members or, even
less so, our enemies (Hess et al. 2014). Here we can surmise that group membership
founded on a collective commitment associates with more robust affective synchrony
than group membership based on merely private affiliation. Emotional alignment in
turn contributes to the predictability of other agents’ actions.
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Michael (2011) points out that emotional alignment functions as a coordina-
tion smoother in joint action in several ways. First, it increases people’s
motivation to act jointly with each other as they find others in similar affective
states warmer and more cooperative as pointed out in 5.1. Besides motivational
effects, emotional convergence also contributes to cognitive and bodily align-
ment as Btwo or more people with congruent emotions will tend to be influ-
enced in the same ways and will therefore tend to converge, or align, with each
other. This would make it easier to predict each other’s actions and to coordi-
nate movements^ (Michael 2011, 366). Emotional alignment facilitates the co-
agents’ ability to make accurate joint predictions through its effects on attention
and memory as well. BIf two people are emotionally aligned, it will increase the
likelihood of noticing the same objects in the context of a joint action. This
would facilitate prediction of each other’s behavior, since knowing what people
are attending to provides clues about the actions they are likely to initiate^
(ibid., 367).
In fact, emotional alignment does not merely increase the likelihood of joint
attention. On our account of shared emotions, joint attention to the shared intentional
object of emotion is a central aspect of both moderately and strongly shared emotions.
The synchronizing and coordinating effects of these emotions are accordingly more
robust than those of weakly shared emotions whose intentional objects are individual
tokens of the same type as in the case of shareholders’ fear for their investments.
Emotional alignment also contributes to the agentive sense of we-agency. Here the
egalitarian context of joint action is perhaps more important than the other structural
factors that facilitate the emergence of shared emotions. Equal participation in the
planning and execution of a joint action does not of course directly give rise to shared
emotions. However, it contributes to the co-agents’ private or collective commitment to
their shared goal, whether or not there is a distinct act of joint or collective commitment
as some philosophical theorists of joint action maintain (Gilbert 2003, 2014; Tuomela
2007, 2013). Through their contribution and commitment to the shared goal, the goal
becomes the co-agents’ shared concern that provides them both motivating and justi-
fying reasons to think, want, act, and feel in ways that are in accordance with their
shared concern, as we pointed above in the discussion on strongly shared emotions
(Section 4). Importantly, this is not merely a normative claim as it draws on empirical
findings (Parkinson et al. 2005). In other words, shared emotions are not merely
contingent responses to events relating to joint goals but part of a projectible pattern
of rationality in the co-agents’ responsiveness to the world, as Bennett Helm (2008)
emphasizes in his account of Bplural agency .^
Our proposal is therefore that the agentive sense of we-agency of Bsharing
the same fate^ or Bbeing in the same boat^ (Tuomela 2007) is experienced
centrally through shared emotions that accompany joint action and rationally
relate to its joint goals (see also Salmela and Nagatsu 2016). These emotions
express the co-agents’ commitment to the joint goal and its mutuality which
highlights the agents’ interdependence in the task. Shared emotions inform the
co-agents about their progress toward the joint goal and about their possible
setbacks in its pursuit; not merely factually but also evaluatively, in terms of
what those progresses or setbacks mean to the participants. These shared
emotions allow the co-agents to have a strong sense of we-agency even when
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they have relatively specific roles in their joint action, and therefore also a
robust sense of self-agency, as in the case of sports teams. This sense of we-
agency manifests in the emotional content such that the co-agents feel joy and
pride Bthat we did it^ if they reach their joint goal; sadness or disappointment
Bthat we failed^ if they don’t; anger at those who Bharmed or wronged us^ by
preventing them from reaching their joint goal; and so on. These emotions,
especially positive ones, also motivate the co-agents to engage in joint action.
In sum, these shared affects constitute a central part of the togetherness and
interdependence that we experience in joint action.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed an account of the phenomenology of joint action
building on Pacherie’s. Our position is both complementary and critical to hers. First
we complemented Pacherie’s account of how the first sense of agency for joint action,
which is outcome-based, arises, by explicating a set of affective mechanisms through
which this sense of agency for joint action is enhanced. We however turned this account
to criticize Pacherie’s understanding of the second sense of agency for joint action,
which she assumes to be incompatible or essentially in tension with self-agency. We
instead argued that shared emotions that are experienced in the course and consequence
of joint action contribute centrally to an agentive sense of we-agency that has no trade-
off with the sense of self-agency.
Our account of the phenomenology of joint action, like Pacherie’s, draws on both
philosophical and empirical studies on joint action. Correspondingly, our main contri-
butions are both philosophical and empirical. On the empirical front, we draw on much
the same literature as Pacherie, but we pay distinct attention to the affective and
motivational mechanisms and to how these contribute to the Bfeel^ of joint action.
On the philosophical front, we apply this empirically grounded understanding to move
beyond simply applying the model of individual agency to the model of agency for
joint action, and put forward the model of agency for joint action that highlights shared
emotions as a theoretical framework to understand the phenomenology of joint action.
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